QED-C Official Calls for Closer U.S.-Europe Quantum Cooperation

A significant claim has been made: Jonathan Felbinger, QED-C Deputy Director, argues in EE Times for closer U.S.-Europe cooperation on supply chains, standards, and infrastructure. His goal is to translate research strengths into industrial power. 

The Strongest Argument for Cooperation

The argument begins with a survey. The QED-C’s State of the Global Quantum Industry 2026 report and its accompanying supply chain study reveal that the quantum sector routinely operates across borders. The consortium noted the industry’s deep reliance on cross-border supply chains. From this perspective, pursuing an independent path appears both costly and slow.

Felbinger’s figures further illustrate this point: The EU boasts 173 quantum-focused companies compared to 164 in the U.S. Europe also employs more workers in these companies, with 6,420 compared to 4,401 in the U.S. Conversely, American firms raised over $2.7 billion in venture capital in 2025, and U.S. job openings slightly outnumbered those in the EU (3,002 versus 2,932).

This data suggests Europe has a stronger base of companies and human capital, while the U.S. possesses greater financial depth. Neither region holds all the necessary components. Therefore, a transatlantic connection seems less an aspiration and more a logical necessity.

The comparison with China underscores the urgency. The article states that Chinese public quantum funding reached $15.3 billion by 2025, representing approximately 27% of global commitments. China also accounts for 54% of quantum patents, with filings increasing by 42% from 2024. This highlights the core of the argument: fragmented allied markets increase costs, while a coordinated competitor continues to invest heavily.

What the Survey Truly Supports

While acknowledging these points, the evidence supports a narrower conclusion than the headline suggests. The supply chain findings primarily indicate general interdependence.

• The percentages are based on self-reported survey responses, not verified trade flows.
• The full methodology, response rates, and specific question wording are not provided in the source, so the figures should be interpreted as indicative.
• The survey identifies supplier and customer countries but does not prioritize critical dependencies or identify substitutable ones.
• Chinese-headquartered companies were not among the respondents, although China is listed as a location. This limits the ability to draw definitive conclusions about “allies versus adversaries.”

The exclusion of Chinese companies significantly weakens any strategic framing. It’s difficult to clearly distinguish between friendly and rival supply chains when a major competitor’s companies were not included in the data.

The workforce composition provides a more solid basis for analysis. Engineering is now the largest category, followed by other operations (14%) and business development (13%). This plausibly indicates that companies increasingly require personnel for manufacturing, sales, and support, not solely for research. Felbinger’s interpretation here seems broadly accurate.

Limitations of the Evidence

A specific flaw is that the survey does not isolate the U.S.-Europe corridor. It lacks a bilateral breakdown to show whether transatlantic links are more significant than, for example, U.S.-Japan or Europe-Canada ties. The data simply indicates global interdependence. While a U.S.-Europe mandate is one plausible interpretation, the data does not specifically highlight it.

Furthermore, the claim lacks clear definitions. “Closer cooperation” could encompass aligned standards, joint fabrication testbeds, coordinated export controls, or simply market access. These are distinct policies with varying costs, and the provided evidence does not specify which policies are justified by the numbers.

Felbinger himself acknowledges the nascent stage of the industry, noting that many quantum companies are pre-commercial and that some applications may take longer than expected or never materialize.

There’s also an inherent bias: the report is self-published by QED-C, whose deputy director made the claim. As a consortium established to foster industry growth, it naturally benefits from increased international coordination. Though this doesn’t invalidate the data, it suggests the framing is oriented towards advocating for more cooperation, aligning with the organization’s mission.

Conclusion

Global interdependence is clearly demonstrated, and a general case for international cooperation logically follows. However, the evidence does not definitively prove that a specific U.S.-Europe policy is the necessary solution, nor does it detail what such a policy should entail.

Regional efforts continue independently, from the launch of the Virginia Quantum Hub to open-source initiatives like Fujitsu’s release of a quantum application package, which represents a subtle form of cross-border collaboration. The market is already forming connections piecemeal.

To strengthen the verdict, a bilateral breakdown specifically isolating the U.S.-Europe corridor would be beneficial. A criticality analysis distinguishing vulnerable dependencies from ordinary ones, along with a clear definition of the costs and benefits of cooperation, would also be valuable. Including Chinese-headquartered respondents would significantly clarify the strategic landscape.

The claim is simultaneously reasonable and under-supported. It should be regarded as a well-reasoned directional suggestion, rather than conclusive proof that any single alliance is indispensable, based solely on a survey of procurement patterns.