TCG Defines What Makes a TPM Post-Quantum Ready
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has issued new guidance defining what constitutes a post-quantum cryptography (PQC)-ready Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The document, which establishes PC Client Platform TPM Profile (PTP) 1.07 as the baseline, introduces two designations: “PQC-ready” and “PQC-upgradable.” This initiative is a specification and naming scheme, not a certified product or an active program.
Overview of the guidance
According to the August 24 press release, a TPM is a small hardware component responsible for storing cryptographic keys and handling attestation and platform integrity checks. According to the TCG document, a TPM qualifies as “PQC-ready” if it implements PTP 1.07, which integrates PQC-specific elements from the recently published TPM 2.0 Library Specification Version 1.85. A part that doesn’t yet support PTP 1.07 but can be updated to it is labeled “PQC-upgradable.”
The goal is to provide buyers with a standard benchmark for evaluating vendor claims. TCG asserts that these requirements enable companies to request concrete evidence of a product’s PQC readiness, rather than simply accepting a “compliance” sticker. A comprehensive explanation of both designations is available on the TCG website.
Joe Pennisi, TCG President, elaborated on the initiative’s purpose in the announcement:
“As PQC capabilities emerge, businesses will need to look beyond individual algorithm support and understand the broader requirements for quantum-safe identities, attestation, and hardware-anchored trust.”
Remaining gaps
A certification process is not yet in place. TCG states it “plans to enhance” its programs to certify TPMs meeting PTP 1.07, with requirements for a certified “PQC-ready TPM” to follow “in due course.” As of now, no specific dates, criteria, or programs have been published. Consequently, the labels are self-applied against the specification, and there’s no third-party TCG mark for verification.
Two additional limitations exist. First, PTP 1.07 defines minimum requirements, meaning that two “PQC-ready” TPMs may differ in the optional algorithms they include. Second, a hardware profile that supports PQC algorithms is only one aspect of a migration strategy. Keys, firmware, and attestation flows still require transition planning over a device’s potentially decades-long lifespan.
Currently, no cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists. The impetus for immediate action stems from the “harvest now, decrypt later” risk and the need for hardware to maintain trustworthiness long enough to withstand that threat. This guidance provides the industry with a common language for TPM readiness. Whether vendors will adopt it and whether a certification program will materialize remains to be seen.