Trezor CTO Warns of Challenges in Quantum-Safe Wallets

A recurring claim this month suggests that hardware and software wallet manufacturers face a slow and expensive transition to quantum resistance, and that delaying action until a functional quantum computer emerges is a misguided strategy. Trezor CTO Tomáš Sušánka clearly articulated the technical aspects of this issue on MARA Foundation TV.
The Core Argument
The argument is straightforward: Wallets secure long-lasting secrets. A seed phrase created today could manage funds for decades, and the underlying signing mechanism is not easily changeable.
Furthermore, firmware is signed, and device authentication relies on the same elliptic-curve cryptography that quantum computers are expected to eventually compromise. Backups replicate state across devices. Supply chains dictate the use of secure-element chips years before a product reaches the market.
Taken together, this means migration isn’t a simple patch. It demands a synchronized overhaul of cryptography, hardware, backup design, and consensus rules. Such large-scale coordination requires years. Therefore, waiting for a cryptographically relevant quantum machine to appear before initiating this process is poor risk management, as the planning window will have closed by the time the threat is confirmed.
Though this argument is generally correct in its direction, the crucial question is what the supporting evidence truly demonstrates.
Examining the Evidence
The primary issue is that most figures cited in the quantum-threat discussion refer to capabilities that do not yet exist on actual hardware. To be precise:
- Google’s elliptic-curve estimate suggests approximately 1,175 logical qubits and over two million Toffoli gates are needed to break relevant curves. This is a resource estimate coupled with a zero-knowledge proof, not a key recovery performed on a physical machine. No qubits have actually broken a key.
- Trail of Bits’ exploit of Google’s proof involved vulnerabilities in the zkVM software stack, which Google subsequently patched. This finding relates to the proof software itself and neither confirms nor refutes the underlying resource claim.
- Horizen Labs offers quantum-security assessments described as standards-aligned. This is a proprietary vendor service, not a deployed wallet or independent certification.
- Innovate UK’s £20 million competition is a funding call for quantum-networking components. These are proposed and awardable projects, not yet built.
- The HKMA-backed banking paper is a sponsor-supported survey of self-reported readiness, as covered here by QNews, not an independent audit of implemented defenses.
Therefore, the threat assessment relies on estimates and proofs. There’s no evidence in the provided record of a demonstrated elliptic-curve break on physical hardware. This limitation informs the conclusion, which will be stated once to avoid repetition.
Where the Uphill Path Presents Challenges
Even without a confirmed quantum break, the specific constraints on wallets are real, and this is where Sušánka’s argument gains significant traction. SHRINCS, a leading post-quantum candidate for Bitcoin, offers stateful signatures that are around ten times smaller than their stateless counterparts. The drawback is state tracking. Reusing a one-time key beyond its allotted use risks leaking enough information for someone to forge a signature and steal funds.
This isn’t a theoretical user experience issue. Sušánka’s example clearly illustrates the problem: two Trezors sharing a single recovery seed can’t reliably share signing state. He noted that the company is considering making the larger stateless signatures the default, relegating the stateful option to advanced settings, which highlights the seriousness with which this failure mode is regarded.
Hardware introduces another layer of complexity. Most signing devices still employ quantum-vulnerable cryptography for firmware and device authentication. Consequently, a fully protected device also requires post-quantum schemes in these areas, independent of whatever the blockchain adopts. Trezor’s Safe 7 already supports post-quantum cryptography for wallet authentication, but its transactions will only become quantum-secure once Bitcoin itself undergoes an upgrade.
Standards are crucial for validating claims. NIST’s FIPS 203 addresses key encapsulation, while 204 and 205 cover signatures. These are “believed” secure based on current analysis, not proven unbreakable, and they’re not interchangeable with proprietary schemes that a vendor might describe as aligned. Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) solve different problems than migrating a signature stack and shouldn’t be conflated in the same assessment.
The Verdict Supported by Evidence
The urgency for planning remains valid. The specific hardware constraints, including long-lived seeds, signed firmware, backup state, and secure-element supplier lock-in, are sufficiently demonstrated in the engineering discussion to justify immediate action.
However, the evidence doesn’t support panic framed as certainty. No quantum advantage over elliptic curves has been demonstrated on hardware. The provided sources don’t mention any shipped, independently audited quantum-resistant wallet, nor do they give pilot or deployment status for any named competitor. Funding calls, vendor services, and sponsor surveys don’t alter these technical realities.
At a minimum, wallet manufacturers should be developing migration options and designing state handling mechanisms that prevent user errors. The quantum timeline should be treated as uncertain, and the migration timeline as long. These two facts are what justify acting early more than any single headline estimate.
For further insight into the distinction between measured and merely modeled threats, refer to QNews’ coverage of Hong Kong’s banks and the quantum clock.