Sweden Launches First National Quantum Strategy Through 2036

A national quantum strategy outlines a country’s goals for funding research, fostering businesses, training workers, and safeguarding networks against future quantum computers. It serves as a plan, not a direct funding mechanism. Sweden released its inaugural strategy on August 24, and its objectives extend through 2036.

The document establishes five key goals: enhancing research and industrial competitiveness, developing a skilled workforce, improving coordination among government, academia, and industry, protecting strategically important quantum technologies, and participating in international collaborations. It encompasses quantum computing, simulation, sensing, and communications, with a significant focus on replacing encryption vulnerable to future quantum computers. This report draws on The Quantum Insider’s coverage of the Swedish strategy, which utilized an AI-assisted translation of the original Swedish text. Readers should prioritize the government’s official text over translated phrasing.

Funding commitments within the strategy

It’s crucial to understand that the Swedish government didn’t allocate a new, dedicated quantum budget with this strategy. Instead, it references existing research programs and a planned initiative to establish “excellence clusters” in strategic technology fields, including quantum.

Therefore, this document functions as a policy framework. Its impact on companies and investors will depend on how these goals translate into research grants, procurement, and industrial programs over the coming years. An announced goal in 2026 doesn’t equate to funding in a lab in 2027.

This strategy builds upon prior efforts, including an analysis delivered to the government by the Swedish Research Council in October 2024, produced in collaboration with the innovation agency Vinnova and external researchers and businesses. It also expands upon Sweden’s 2025 to 2028 research and innovation policy, which had already designated quantum technology as a strategic research area.

Sweden’s research foundation and achievements

The plan heavily relies on the Wallenberg Centre for Quantum Technology (WACQT), coordinated by Chalmers University of Technology. WACQT is a twelve-year initiative funded with approximately one billion Swedish kronor, primarily focused on developing a domestic superconducting quantum computer.

Superconducting machines store quantum information in electrical circuits cooled to near absolute zero, an approach also used by IBM and Google. WACQT achieved a 25-qubit processor in 2024 and launched a version of its system for company testing in 2025. Its stated goal is to reach 100 qubits by 2029. This figure represents a development target.

A qubit is the quantum equivalent of a bit. Though a classical bit is either zero or one, a qubit can exist in quantum combinations of these states, allowing quantum systems to approach certain calculations differently than conventional ones. Increasing the number and quality of qubits while minimizing errors remains the central engineering challenge, which no team has yet solved at a useful scale.

WACQT also has an agreement with IBM, providing Swedish researchers and companies access to larger IBM processors, as Sweden develops its own hardware. The strategy extends beyond computing to sensing, communications, and simulation, some of which are closer to commercial viability. Sweden aims for this research to lead to more rapid company formation than in the past.

Proactive encryption protection

Cybersecurity receives dedicated attention because a sufficiently powerful quantum computer could eventually compromise the public-key cryptography that secures internet traffic, financial transactions, and government networks. Such a machine, running the right algorithm, could solve certain mathematical problems underlying current encryption far more quickly than classical computers.

Currently, no such machine exists at a useful scale. Sweden’s argument is that organizations cannot wait for its arrival before updating vulnerable systems. This concern is known as “harvest now, decrypt later,” where attackers record encrypted data today and store it until a future quantum computer can read it, thereby endangering data that requires long-term secrecy. Sweden’s cybersecurity policy assumes cryptographically relevant quantum computers could emerge in the early 2030s.

The strategy outlines two protective measures that operate very differently. Quantum key distribution (QKD) utilizes quantum effects to enable two parties to share encryption keys in a way that reveals any interception. QKD systems are commercially available but require dedicated infrastructure, limiting their applicability. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC), on the other hand, replaces vulnerable mathematics with algorithms designed to resist both classical and quantum attacks. Because PQC runs on ordinary computers and networks, it can be deployed without new quantum hardware.

A distinction not explicitly detailed in the strategy, but important for readers, is that international bodies have standardized specific PQC algorithms. The US NIST published FIPS 203, 204, and 205 for key establishment and digital signatures in 2024. These standards are currently believed to be secure based on ongoing review, not proven unbreakable, and their safety depends on correct implementation. “Supports NIST PQC” is also not equivalent to a validated FIPS 140-3 cryptographic module. Sweden’s national cybersecurity authorities have issued transition recommendations, integrating this work into the country’s wider security strategy.

Workforce development, funding, and international partnerships

The second significant challenge identified is human capital. The strategy calls for stronger graduate schools connected to quantum research groups, more industrial doctoral and postdoctoral positions, and increased efforts to attract women to the field. These objectives are linked to Sweden’s national STEM strategy from 2025.

The skills gap reflects the interdisciplinary nature of quantum work. Building quantum hardware demands expertise in physics, electrical engineering, materials science, computer science, and specialized manufacturing. Commercialization then requires software developers and systems engineers capable of integrating quantum machines with existing infrastructure.

Regarding partnerships, Sweden and the United States signed a Technology Prosperity Deal in May 2026, encompassing quantum alongside AI, telecommunications, biomedicine, energy, space, manufacturing, and defense. This agreement is non-binding, representing intent and not a funded program. Sweden is also fostering quantum ties through Nordic cooperation, the European Union, and NATO. These channels align the plan with the EU’s push to reduce reliance on external suppliers for sensitive technologies.

The key takeaway for those monitoring national quantum policy is to interpret Sweden’s strategy as a coordination signal supported by existing funds. The research foundation is robust, the 100-qubit target is a projection, and the security guidance is sound within its scope. Future budget cycles will reveal whether these goals receive the necessary funding or remain on paper.