Qunnect Explores Quantum Security Applications Beyond QKD
Qunnect has released a white paper asserting that quantum entanglement can secure networks in ways that extend beyond encryption key distribution. Concurrently, the company announced several engagements with U.S. federal agencies. The paper, titled “Entanglement for Security, Beyond QKD,” outlines three security applications currently being developed on Qunnect’s Carina hardware.
These projects involve collaborations with DARPA, and the Department of Energy. This publication comes at a time when Congress is directing the Department of War to develop quantum networks and the White House is urging agencies to strengthen their systems against quantum threats.
Key Points of the Paper
Qunnect presents the paper as an argument for augmenting existing encryption with physical verification of location, connection integrity, and device identity. The three applications under development, all attributed to Qunnect and described as in-progress rather than deployed, are:
- Quantum Position Verification (QPV): This aims to prove the origin point and time of a signal, which Qunnect positions as an alternative to GPS or IP geolocation for location verification.
- Quantum Factor Authentication (QFA): A quantum test that the company claims authenticates devices and is resilient to AI-enhanced impersonation and attacks on hardware fingerprints.
- Quantum Channel Protection (QCP): This transforms the fiber line into a sensor designed to detect tampering such as taps, splices, or rerouting, which the company links to “harvest-now, decrypt-later” vulnerabilities.
The company highlights that its metropolitan network in New York has facilitated collaborations with Cisco and NYU. Additionally, Deutsche Telekom utilizes Qunnect hardware to anchor a network in Berlin, and New Mexico commissioned ABQ-Net in downtown Albuquerque. Qunnect states that these networks operate at room temperature using existing telecom fiber. CEO Noel Goddard noted that the company embarked on building applications beyond key distribution five years ago.
Beyond QKD, Alongside PQC
Qunnect’s argument addresses a limitation of point-to-point Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), which distributes keys but does not verify the origin of a signal or the authenticity of a device. This approach differs from the path most of the industry has adopted, specifically the NIST post-quantum cryptographic standards FIPS 203, 204, and 205, which define software algorithms like ML-KEM, ML-DSA, and SLH-DSA rather than hardware-based schemes. Qunnect’s methodology is distinct from this standardization effort and is not intended as a replacement.
The claims presented here originate from Qunnect and its white paper, with no independent assessment available in the provided reporting. Quantum activity is also expanding in other areas, including a new Virginia Quantum Hub led by George Mason University.